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Types of Complementarity, Combinative Organization Forms and 
Structural Heterogeneity: Beyond Discrete Structural Alternatives1 
Anna Grandori, CRORA, Bocconi University 
 Santi Furnari, Cass Business School, City University London 
 
Prologue 
“If any approach to defining organizational forms can be regarded as standard, it is 
one that regards forms as particular clusters of features. The example par excellence is 
Weber’s specification of rational-legal bureaucracy in terms of the nature of authority 
(...), procedures (...), and the employment relation of the official (…).” (Polos, Hannan, 
Carroll 2002). In spite of the broad consensus on the above concept, originating in the 
sociology of organization, apparently there has been much less effort and consensus on 
a systematic definition of which are the fundamental ‘features’ of organization, and 
according to which laws they are supposed to cluster. In the first Section, this paper 
offers a critical re-reading of the notions of organization forms in organization theory 
and organization economics aimed at singling out what has been established and what 
stands up to scrutiny on those two important issuesi . In the second Section, building on 
these elements and on earlier works by the present authors (Grandori 1997; 1999; 
Grandori and Furnari 2008), the paper provides a typology of organizational ‘features’, 
a theory of how they are expected to combine inspired by an analogy with chemistry, 
                                                 
1
 This work has been published as Chapter 4 in Morroni M. (ed.). 2009. Corporate Governance, 
Organization and the Firm: Co-operation and Outsourcing in a Globalised Market’. Edward Elgar 
Publishers, London, UK. When this chapter was published, one of the authors (Santi Furnari) was PhD 
Candidate at Bocconi University, Milan. 
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and a formalized operationalization of the main propositions through an innovative 
application of Boolean algebra. 
Limits of the ‘discrete structural alternatives’ view of organization forms 
A view of organization forms as discrete clusters of features or attributes has been 
dominant in the major traditions of study concerned with organization internal structure 
and external networks. Organization theory has characterized organization forms as, for 
example, unitary-functional versus divisional forms, mechanistic versus organic forms, 
adhocratic versus bureaucratic, and so on. Organizational features have been typically 
conceived as devices for partitioning and coordinating activities, including the 
Weberian features of specialization and distinct responsibility, legal authority and 
formal procedures, enriched by a variety of ‘team-like’ and mutual adjustment devices 
(Thompson 1967; Mintzberg 1979). Organizational economics has enlarged the notion 
of organization and governance forms to include the division of labor and the modes of 
coordination between firms, and has envisaged ‘discrete structural alternatives’ such as 
markets, hierarchies and hybrids. The Weberian  features of authority and rule-like 
governance have been accompanied by price/incentive and exit mechanisms as they are 
central for defining market governance forms, as well as by the informal coordination 
mechanisms of teams and culture, employed for defining clan forms (Grandori 1999). 
As to the laws of combination among the above mentioned features, classical 
organization theory argued that each coordination mechanism is to be found in an 
organized system, under conditions of effectiveness, conditional on the presence (or the 
presence at some specified intensity) of some contingency variable, such as uncertainty, 
strategies, technology, type of interdependence, system size (Lawrence and Lorsch 
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1967; Thompson 1967; Pugh et al 1969; Van de Ven et al. 1976). As a corollary, in this 
approach, features/mechanisms of various kinds cluster as they are cumulatively 
employed in the same system to govern activities and transactions with different 
characteristics (e.g. more or less uncertain and interdependent activities).  
 
Organizational economics has more explicitly characterized organization forms as 
bundles of attributes, supposed to be similar to each other within a form, and ‘different 
in kind’ across forms: “alternative modes of governance (markets, hybrids, firms, 
bureaus) differ in kind – which is to say in discrete structural ways” (Williamson 2004, 
285). The author maintains that, as a corollary, features/mechanisms of different kinds 
cannot cluster under conditions of effectiveness (the so-called ‘impossibility of 
selective intervention’) (2004, 287): “selective intervention breaks down because the 
internally consistent syndromes of incentive, control, and contract law attributes that 
define markets and hierarchies differ”. Each internally consistent ‘syndrome of 
attributes’ is presumed to be superior in the governance of transactions with different 
characteristics (e.g. more or less uncertain and more or less specific transactions).  
 
There are various limitations in these interpretations of the notion of discrete structural 
alternatives.  
- The term  was originally used by Simon (as Williamson stresses) who pointed out 
that organizational choices (like all social choices) are not based on judgments 
focused “on how variables are equated at margin” but  “focused on qualitative and 
structural questions, typically, on the choice among a small number of discrete 
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institutional alternatives” (Simon 1978, 6). Those choices among qualitatively 
different structural devices has been interpreted in organizational economics as 
choices among real, full ‘institutions’, such as ‘the market’ and ‘the firm’. 
However, and this is the key difference between the approach taken here and that 
of organizational economics, qualitative differences, and related choices, can be 
referred to features or mechanisms themselves, not about packages or clusters of 
features, i.e. organization form. Actually, Simon’s own examples of ‘structural 
questions’ (1978, 6) tend to be referred to single governance mechanisms or 
practices. In his words:  “Not ‘how much flood insurance will a man buy’ but 
‘what are the structural conditions that make buying insurance rational or 
attractive’?” Not ‘at what levels will wages be fixed’ but when will work be 
performed under an employment contract rather than a sale contract?’”  Nothing 
is really said on how these qualitatively different structural elements may or may 
not combine into more complex, multi-feature, organization forms. Hence, the 
proposition that qualitatively different elements cannot cluster together is not 
really a corollary of Simon’s thesis. Nor does that proposition seem to have a 
clear empirical basis: quite to the contrary, organizational solutions that combine 
devices as different in kind as incentives, communities, rules and authority seem 
to be more the rule than the exception in successful modern economic 
organization.  
Finally, what constitutes similarity and difference ‘in kind’ has not been clearly 
defined. While it is clear that a qualitative comparative analysis is different from a 
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quantitative marginal analysis (Simon’s concern); it is not clear when a structural 
element is ‘different in kind’ from another element (Williamson’s concern). 
 
- In the organization theory tradition, the clustering of features is considered as a 
result of one-to-one correspondences between each feature and a context. There 
has been little modeling, and especially theoretical modeling, of the interaction 
effects of the application of various organizational mechanisms; i.e. whether the 
employment of, say, programs, at some intensity, interacts positively or 
negatively with, say, the use of teamwork, and at which intensity level.   
 
- In both organization theory and organizational economics, it is supposed that 
there is ‘one best way of organizing under any given circumstance’ (defined in 
terms of the independent contextual variables), i.e. possible equifinalities among 
forms are neglected.  
 
The two last limitations have been to some extent overcome by more recent 
configurational views of discrete structural alternatives - the ‘configurational’ approach 
in organization studies; and the ‘complementarity-based’ approach in organizational 
economics- especially because they have considered the interaction effects among 
features. 
The configurational approach has defined an organization form as “Any 
multidimensional constellation of conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly 
occur together” (Meyer et al. 1993), as ‘tightly interdependent and mutually supportive 
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elements’ assuming that “what is crucial is that a relatively small number of these 
configurations or types encompass a large fraction of the population of organizations” 
(Miller, Friesen 1984, 1). Research in this perspective have looked at the actual, 
observed combinations among wide arrays of organizational devices (actually, devices 
of all sorts: from formal rules and policies in budgetary processes or in personnel 
management, to task forces and committees, to environmental scanning procedures, to 
central staff units, to the use of equity, and so on and so forth) and correlated these 
combinations with indicators of performance. Typically, configurational approaches 
posited “higher effectiveness for organizations that resemble one of the ideal types 
defined in the theory. The increased effectiveness is attributed to the internal 
consistency among the patterns of relevant contextual, structural and strategic factors" 
(Doty, Glick and Huber, 1993, 1196). 
The complementarity-based approach in organizational economics, has been 
pointing in a similar direction. Organizational attributes are defined as ‘complementary’ 
if doing (more of) any one of them increases the returns to doing (more of) the others 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Organizational ‘features’ or ‘attributes’ have been  
conceived as ‘practices’ of any sort: in empirical studies, large sets of practices have 
been considered, such as teamwork and incentive pay, flexible job assignment and 
knowledge management (Laursen and Mahnke 2001; Ichniowski et al. 1997); or 
process and project organization, horizontal integration, delayering, outsourcing, and 
alliances (Whittington et al. 1999); and the observed combinations among them have 
been correlated with performance. 
 7 
These approaches have addressed some of the problems of the earlier notion of 
organizational and governance form as discrete structural alternatives, but have opened 
up new problems as well. Most notably, on the positive side, interactions among 
organizational attributes are considered and are at center stage. Second, the notion of 
complementarity is wider than that of consistency by ‘similarity in kind’, as 
complementarities can also stem, in principle, from differences among the clustering 
features. Third, equifinality is admitted: i.e. the possibility that more than one 
configuration is effective under any given circumstance (Gresov and Drazin 1997). 
However, the following problems remain or have emerged (Grandori and Furnari 
2008): 
 
- The lists of features or practices considered have been very extensive and 
different according to the organization problem considered. Field-specific 
operationalization is certainly fine, but is there any underlying common logic?  
Content lists are infinite and prediction is impossible if some general properties 
of elements, predicting the likelihood of different types of links or 
combinations, are not formulated.  
 
- Combinative laws have been rather post-hoc: whatever elements are observed to 
be combined in practice and correlated to performance are said to be 
‘complementary’ (i.e. any combination of elements found under positive 
performance is defined as an "internally consistent" configuration); hence the 
explanatory law is inferred from the very pattern it should explain. No theory of 
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combination is provided, that would make it possible to predict and explain 
effective combinations, let alone to design new ones.  
 
- Configurational researchers have been using correlational methods that obscure 
the possible equifinality and non-linearity relationships among organizational 
attributes. In other terms, the methods applied can be deemed not well suited to 
support configurational inquiry (Fiss, 2007).  
 
- Forms are defined using each and all the features that appear in the initial list of 
elements. This does not allow to ‘polish the list’, to detect which ‘features’ are 
more or less relevant in affecting performance outcomes, which differences 
make a difference.   
 
Organization forms as chemical formulas 
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be concluded that the two basic 
ingredients for defining organization forms as ‘clusters of features’ – i.e. a general 
notion of organizational ‘features’ or components; and general laws of combinations 
among them - have not been satisfactorily defined thus far. They deserve further and 
different attacks. The approach illustrated here does represent a rather different attack to 
those problems. It is different because it shifts the unit of analysis from the ‘attributes’ 
of a whole entity to its constitutive ‘elements’. Differences and similarities may become 
much clearer if analyzed at the level of the elementary building blocks of organization, 
rather than as ‘attributes’ of an entity or organism. It is the difference that passes 
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between classic zoology –observing and classifying animals into different species 
because they have different ‘attributes’ (height and weight, blood temperature, hair or 
skin, legs or wings) or evolutionary biology (how these attributes have been selected 
over history) - and chemistry or genetics (what are the basic elements of which all 
matter is composed and how they combine to generate different organic and inorganic 
forms of life). The present contribution starts from what may constitute a basic analysis 
of the latter type, namely, a ‘chemistry of organization’. 
 
A table of organizational elements 
Some basic qualitative distinctions among features can be defined by using the  
classical, stylized, and generally agreed upon characterization of an organization form 
as a set of modes of ‘division’ and of ‘connection’ among parts of a system (Mintzberg 
1979; Marturana and Varela 1980).  These ‘modes’ can be said to be qualitatively 
different if: 
-  the system is partitioned into units that are vertically and horizontally differentiated 
or is unsegmented;   
- units are connected through partner-specific communication (either directly or 
through brokering hubs), or through impersonal generally available information 
(such as prices or rules and norms);  
- actions are decided upon in an ad hoc way or in a programmed, rule-guided way; 
-  decision rights are evenly or unevenly distributed among units (to all of them in a 
full democracy, or, at the other extreme, to one party only in a fully centralized 
system).  
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These fundamental properties can be used to define classes of organizational elements 
(analogous to a ‘Table of elements’ in natural chemistry) that can be said to be different 
in kind as the nature of the nodes and links is different (analogously, we believe, to the 
grouping of natural elements into gases, metals and non metals according to their 
atomic structure).  
Four  general classes of elements, in economic organization, can be defined as different 
in kind according to the above general properties  (Fiske 1992; Miller 1992; Grandori  
1999)ii, and are adopted as a starting ‘table of elements’ for a ‘chemistry of 
organization’ (Grandori and Furnari 2008): 
 
- ‘market’ elements, whereby different parts of a system  are connected by value-
based exchange devices (such as incentives, prices, stocks and exit); a converse 
of non value-based, ‘resource pooling and associational’ elements;  
- ‘bureaucratic’ elements (including  all kinds of de-personalized rules and 
specialized office systems); a converse of elements of ‘personalism, informality 
and generalism’;  
- ‘democratic’ elements: devices through which each node is ‘represented’ (e.g. 
through vote and voice rights, or residual decision rights);  a converse of 
elements of  ‘centralization’;       
- ‘communitarian elements’, aligning knowledge and preference through identity 
and community building, and knowledge sharing; a converse of elements of 
‘differentiation’. 
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Table 1 - adapted from Grandori and Furnari (2008) - shows the four fundamental types 
of organizational elements, the single elements identifiable within each of the four 
types, and a set of contemporary relevant organizational practices predominantly 
containing each type of element, along with the references to the studies that have 
discussed the use of these elements. This ‘Table’ is not exhaustive, but not even the 
Table of elements in natural chemistry was so (many new elements have been identified 
since its formulation). The important step is to specify elements in terms of general 
structure and properties – so that new elements can be discovered and so that the 
composition of any ‘dirty’ and noisy, more or less complex, observable practice (e.g. 
‘MBO’, to quote one that typically includes multiple elements) can be understood. .A 
fortiori, the ‘description’ of a whole organization and governance ‘form’ would no 
longer be expressed as an array of features and practices, but as a compact chemical 
‘formula’, specifying its ‘composition’ in terms of elements of community, democracy, 
bureaucracy and market (see examples in next paragraph). This language is general 
enough to describe the organization and governance forms of systems of economic 
action at various levels: from the micro-system of work to entire firms, to the 
organization of industries and networks.   
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Doses of an element 
In addition to classes of elements, ‘states’ or ‘values’ or ‘numbers’ of elements should 
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be defined in order to formulate meaningful combinatory laws. How can one say that a 
particular element, for example ‘all to all direct mutual adjustment’ or ‘teaming’, can or 
cannot combine with others? What is needed are doses of the element, e.g. low versus 
high doses of teaming, as well as some indication of the doses of other elements it can 
be combined with for generating different substances. In other words, an analogue of 
the number of atoms of an element entering a chemical formula is required. Through 
the analogy, it also clearly appears that complementarities can arise among elements 
employed at any dose. low values are as interesting as high values. Indeed, there is 
nothing interesting or valuable in employing ‘more of an element’.  
In other terms, refining and  generalizing Milgrom and Robert’s (1995) notion, rather 
than definining complementarity only in reference to marginal increases in the 
application of elements (‘more of’ X), we define complementarity as referred to any 
variation in the intensity of application of an element.  It may well be that ‘more of X’ 
is complementary with ‘less of Y’ or with an intermediate dose of Y.  Hence, we will 
analyze complementarity among elements in a state, or at a dose: two elements are 
complementary, in certain doses, if the returns of applying them in these doses are 
higher than in other combinations of doses.  
Which levels of an element may be considered low, medium or high depends on the 
type of system analyzed and the context – even the ‘normal’ level of iron in blood may 
vary across climates, races and ages. Hence, in our organizational chemistry it seems 
sensible to define these levels in empirical and relative terms, rather than in absolute 
terms. Here, whatever the sample of systems considered, we have so far defined ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ in reference to some average or normal value (Grandori and Furnari 2008).  
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Types of complementarities and combinatory laws 
Two goods are complementary if the demand for one increases the demand for the 
other, because the value of their joint use is much higher than the value of their disjoint 
use (for example, pasta and tomatoes or shoes and bag of the same style). In fact, 
Milgrom and Roberts (1995) seminal contribution defines complementarity in an 
unbounded set as V(x’,x’’)>V(x’)+V(x’’), where x’ and x’’ are any two organizational 
devices. 
We accept this definition, but a further question needs to be answered before a 
complementarity based explanation of organization forms can be given: what is the 
origin of the surplus value of the ‘joint application’ of two organizational devices, i.e. 
where does complementarity come from? In addition, when, precisely, can an 
application of organizational devices be said to be ‘joint’? 
Answering these questions leads to a distinction among different possible sources of 
complementarity. Looking at the gastronomy and fashion examples mentioned above, 
one may notice that complementarity stems from different sources in the two cases. A 
pair of shoes and a bag of the same style are complementary because they share similar 
features but they deploy these features in different parts of a system. Pasta and tomato 
sauce, on the other hand, have different attributes and their contributions to a good dish 
are inseparable (i.e. the quality of the dish is basically due to interaction effects). Using 
the notion of ‘difference in kind’ among organizational elements developed above, it is 
possible to distinguish two types of organizational complementarities according to 
whether the elements applied together are different or similar. In addition, though, it 
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should be clarified what ‘applied together’ means. As the above examples highlight, 
here too there are at least two ways: the application is to the same system but in 
different parts, or it is to the very same part (the same activity, transaction, resource 
etc). Using the phrase “application domain” to designate the ‘part’ of a system to which 
an element is applied its ‘application domain’, we have:  
 
a) ‘symbiotic’ complementarity, if surplus value is generated by different elements  
applied to the same application domain;  
b) ‘pooled’ complementarity if surplus value is generated by similar elements 
applied to different application domains. 
 
Both types of complementarity involve interaction effects (by definition of 
complementarity), in the sense that the value of the (symbiotic or pooled) sum is greater 
than the sum of the values of the parts.  The case of symbiotic complementarity is 
obvious. A puzzle could be a good example of pooled interaction: puzzle pieces are all 
similar, the value of any single piece alone is almost zero, only the pooling of all parts 
has a positive value (see an image). As examples of pooled complementarity among 
organizational practices, one may cite the use of incentives in line and staff units, or the 
involvement in community building of all units and not merely of some units. Examples 
of symbiotic complementarities among organizational practices are found when, say, 
pay for performance, teamwork and formal standardized procedures of performance 
evaluation are applied to the same people or units. 
It will be shown that the distinction is useful as these two types of complementarity 
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have different implications for the laws of combination of organizational elements. In 
addition, the double distinction between similarity-/difference-based complementarity, 
and of same/different application domain, implies that there are another two possible 
combinations that do not generate complementarity: 
 
c) elements that are similar in kind and have the same application domain, are 
substitutes, i.e. their combinations are redundant;  
d) elements that are dissimilar and have different application domains are 
independent (neither substitutable nor complementary).  
 
The four types of relationships among two generic types of organizational elements are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Evaluation functions and multifunctionality   
In order to be substantively more precise in specifying which kind of differences 
may generate complementarity, an evaluation function must be defined. What is a 
‘good outcome’ with respect to which a combination of elements may be evaluated? 
We propose to use distinct functions rather than one overall performance function (as it 
has been typically been done in the assessment of discrete structural alternatives), for 
several reasons. 
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- The  relationship between the overall performance of a system and its 
organizational  configuration is too ‘noisy’; 
-  The performance of economic systems is usually measured financially, which is a 
useful yardstick for some purposes; but it is not a good indicator of the utility or 
value generated by a system, as no monetary single indicator is a good indicator 
of the value of complex goods in general, in particular where multiple 
beneficiaries and complex trade-offs are involved (Sen 1999). Hence, it is 
preferable to use a portfolio of functions, as it is typically done in design theory in 
other fields, such as architecture (Boland and Collopy 2004; March 1976);   
- Operationalizing results into qualitatively different consequences allows detection 
of counter-intuitive combinations between configurations and consequences. For 
example, it is entirely conceivable to have highly communitarian, identity based 
combinations generating brilliant economic results (and perhaps too oppressive 
socialization); and highly market-like, incentive driven systems, generating very 
poor economic results (but perhaps an exciting sports-like social atmosphere). 
 
Among the qualitatively different, relevant parameters against which an organizational 
combination may be evaluated, at least three seem to be important beyond any 
reasonable doubt: efficiency, effectiveness and equity (Grandori 1999). Then, in the 
laws presented below, all these three types of outcomes will be considered. It is worth 
pointing out that these outcomes received also an initial test in the empirical study 
(Grandori and Furnari 2008) mentioned below (the effectiveness parameter used in the 
study has been the rate of innovation outcome).  
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Here it can be further noticed that elements may be more or less specialized with 
respect to particular outcomes. Some elements are more ‘generalist’ and 
multifunctional, while others are more ‘specialist’ and mono-functional.. Possible 
consequences of the different degree of multifunctionality of elements for combinatory 
laws are: 
 
- more generalist elements should more frequently be useful components in 
organizational formulas, i.e. in formulas that are effective at producing different 
types of results, while specialized elements should be useful in the production of 
only one type of result; 
- more generalist elements may be  more ‘stable’, i.e. less in need of combination 
with  other  elements, and be substitutable by other generalist elements or by a 
combination of many specialist elements; by contrast, specialist elements should be 
more ‘unstable’, i.e. they need complements in order to deliver good outcomes, and 
more precisely they need complements of a different kind. 
 
Expressing organizational formulas through Boolean Comparative Analysis   
         In an earlier paper (Grandori and Furnari 2008), we used Boolean Comparative 
Analysis (Ragin, 1987; 2000) to formalize organization forms as chemical formulas and 
test a set of basic combinatory laws on a medium-sized sample of firms. Here below, 
we briefly introduce the language of Boolean Comparative Analysis (BCA hereafter), 
illustrating only the technical features of this methodology that are strictly necessary to 
understand the subsequent formalization of the combinatory laws.iii  
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Let us hypothesize that the adoption of one market-like element (say, monetary 
incentives to human resources) will be per se sufficient to produce a level of firm 
efficiency above the industry average. Labelling the causal condition “presence of one 
dose of market” as M1 and the outcome “presence of efficiency above the average” as 
E>A , this hypothesis can be translated into the following Boolean algebra statement: 
 
M1 ---> E>A 
 
where, according to standard Boolean algebra notation, ---> denotes the logical 
implication operator and capital letters indicate the presence of a causal condition or 
outcome .iv  
The typical objective of BCA is to determine the simultaneous presence and absence of 
causal conditions under which a certain outcome is present. To this end, cases are 
formalized as combinations of elements through the use of Boolean algebra operators 
"AND" ("*") and "OR" ("+"). These operators allow to specify the relations between 
more than one causal condition: suppose for example that the adoption of highly 
powered incentives is not sufficient per se to foster firm efficiency without the 
application of one bureaucratic element (say, an adequate monitoring system). This 
hypothesis can be formalized into the following Boolean statement: 
 
M1*B1 --> E>A 
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where "*" denotes the logical Boolean operator "AND". The above statement reads as 
"M1 AND B1 imply E>A ": the occurrence of outcome E>A requires the presence of one 
element of both B and M, i.e. B and M in one dose are strictly complementary in the 
achievement of that outcome. The Boolean operator “AND” therefore represents 
relations of complementarity. 
Let us now suppose that there are two other complementary elements of a different type 
that can also produce the same outcome E>A: for example C1 and D1, representing 
respectively a community-like element (say, teamwork) and an element of democratic 
governance (say, the distribution of representation rights). The Boolean expression will 
be:  
M1*B1 + C1*D1 --> E>A 
 
where "+" denotes the logical operator "OR". The above statement could be read as 
"M1 AND B1 OR C1 AND D1 imply above average E": if any of the two 
combinations is present, the outcome will occur. Hence the Boolean operator "OR" 
represents relations of substitutability (equifinality). Using these operators, BCA 
employs logical minimization algorithms and probabilistic tests in order to identify the 
necessary and sufficient combinations of elements to achieve given outcomes (Ragin, 
1987; 2000). 
  
In using Boolean algebra language to formalize the hypothesized combinatory 
laws presented below, we generalize the notations used in the example above. 
Specifically, we agree to indicate types of elements in capital letters (M = Market-like; 
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B = Bureaucratic; C = Communitarian; D = Democratic) and the number of doses (or 
atoms) for each type of element with a small subscript at the bottom of the letters, as in 
chemical formulas. Thus, the generic organizational formula  can be written in the form 
Mm- Bb – Cc – Dd..  
The empirical study presented in Grandori and Furnari (2008) proposes a way of 
operationalizing and measuring the notion of ‘one dose’ or ‘one atom’ of an element. In 
that study a dose of an element is measured as the number of practices (see Table 1) 
employed beyond the average level. In some of the laws, a notion of ‘maximum’ level 
of application is also used. One way to operationalize this general notion of maximum 
is to consider the maximum average intensity of application across all the four elements 
in systems of a certain type in a certain context, as is done in the above mentioned 
empirical study (where this value is found to be 4).  
The three organizational outcomes considered here will be indicated with capital letters 
( E = efficiency; I = innovation; F = fairness). The subscript ‘>A’ at the bottom of these 
letters indicates that the specific organizational outcome is achieved at a ‘high level’, 
operationalized as above average (of course other thresholds may be used for 
operationalizing ‘high’ performance). 
 
Combination laws  
Combination laws can be expressed as conditions that organizational formulas 
should respect. The first four laws (conditions I to IV) have been formulated and 
received an empirical test in Grandori and Furnari (2008); they are expressed in a more 
formalized manner here (this is useful for developing the more complex laws of 
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structural heterogeneity presented here). The character of the first four conditions is that 
of universal laws to which any high performing organizational formula should obey 
(this obviously does not mean that only one high performing formula exists). The laws 
of structural heterogeneity (conditions V to XII) are a distinctive contribution of the 
present paper (only the initial conditions V and VI were conjectured in our former 
study).   
 
-      It is extremely likely that in any system, even very simple ones, there are activities 
of different kinds; and that elements of different kinds are superior in order to regulate 
these activities (Grandori and Soda 2006). In addition, it is extremely likely that any 
system, even a small system, that tries to coordinate everything using only one kind of 
element, no matter which (say plans or incentives) is not viable (Stark 2007). Finally, it 
is conjectured that, at least at low doses, the four elements entail positive symbiotic 
complementarities (Grandori and Furnari 2008). 
Hence: The presence of (at least one dose of) elements of different kind is a necessary 
condition for an organizational formula achieving high performance of any sort (‘Law 
of organizational core variety’).   Thus, a testable, formalized proposition is the 
following: 
 
Condition I 
M>1* B>1* C>1* D>1  E>A  
M>1* B>1* C>1* D>1  I>A 
M>1* B>1* C>1* D>1  F>A 
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Our discussion of the effects of similarity among mechanisms, leads to the observation 
that mechanisms which are similar in kind are complementary above all if they are used 
in different parts of the system, i.e. they can bring about pooled complementarity, not 
symbiotic complementarity. If similar elements are employed at increasing doses in the 
same domain, marginal benefits should decrease.   
Hence: There are decreasing marginal returns, and, beyond some point, negative 
returns, to increases in the intensity of the same kind of element in the same application 
domain (‘Law of decreasing marginal returns to organizational homogeneity’).  
In other words, a necessary condition for high performance is that each and every 
element is not applied over and above a certain value that we thus define as 
‘maximum’. Hence, a sufficient condition for low performance is the following: 
 
Condition II 
X>max   Y<A,  
 
where X indicates a generic type of element (M, B, C, D) and Y a generic type of 
outcome (E, I, F). 
 
People’s energy, cognitive capacity and behavioral flexibility is limited; hence, 
individuals are unlikely to be able to attend and respond simultaneously to: strong 
incentives; strong demands for identification; intense requirements of conformity to 
rules and the use of procedures; the right and duty to exert one’s best judgment; the 
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need to be, at one and the same time, organizational citizens who are highly 
entrepreneurial, highly solidaristic, highly compliant, actively and critically 
participating to the life of the organization. In addition, practices are costly, and choice 
among alternative investments in different practices may become an issue as the total 
amount of investment increases. 
 Hence: There are decreasing marginal returns, and beyond some point, negative 
returns, to increases in the intensity of all kinds of elements in the same application 
domain. (‘Law of decreasing marginal returns to organizational variety’) 
Formalized testable propositions deriving from the law are those expressed by the 
following condition: 
 
Condition III 
M>max * B>max * C>max * D>max  E<A  
M>max * B>max * C>max * D>max  I<A 
 M>max * B>max * C>max * D>max  F<A 
 
If only this condition III were valid (the simultaneous application of elements in high 
doses predicts low performance) but not condition II ( the application of a single  element 
in  a high dose predicts low performance), it would mean that there are negative 
complementarities, beyond some level, among elements that differ in kind, and not 
among elements that are similar in kind. 
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Through an empirical investigation on the combinatory laws expressed above in a 
sample of 75 large Italian firms, Grandori and Furnari (2008) found strong evidence 
supporting the hypothesized relationships among similar/different organizational 
elements: 89% of highly efficient firms and 93% of highly innovative firms respect the 
combinatory rule ‘all different types of organizational elements should be adopted in 
the firm, with values comprised between a lower and an upper bound’ (operationalized 
as 1 and 3 in the study). In other words, any high performing formula is internally 
varied, at least at a base level, and the law of decreasing marginal returns applies to 
each single type of element: i.e. the prime origin of the upper bounds is decreasing or 
shows negative returns to one-sidedness and homogeneity, not the negative interactions 
among elements of different kinds. Testing for the necessity and sufficiency of these 
findings, the authors found respect of the laws to be a statistically significant, necessary 
and sufficient condition for high efficiency and a significant necessary condition for 
high innovationv. 
 
Introducing types of outcomes   
In Grandori and Furnari (2008) we also advanced the hypothesis that the optimal 
intensity of each element in an organizational formula (within the lower and upper 
bounds specified by the former laws) is contingent on the type of performance outcome 
generated (‘Law of structural heterogeneity’).   
As to efficiency and innovation, we hypothesized that bureaucratic elements are more 
specialized in the achievement of internal efficiency of a system, while market, 
communitarian and democratic elements are more specialized in the achievement of 
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innovation. The tested hypothesis tested was that highly efficient organizational 
formulas are enriched in bureaucracy, while highly innovative organizational formulas 
are enriched in one or more of the other elements. Hence, constraining all the doses of 
elements (m, b, c, d) to be > 1 due to the first ‘law of organizational core variety’: 
Condition IV 
Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd - E>A  if    b >  m* c * d 
Condition V 
Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd  I>A    if    m + c + d  > b 
 
Fairness outcomes were not considered in our earlier study. Here, we hypothesize that 
they should be generated by formulas enriched both in bureaucracy and communitarian 
or democratic elements, as the former elements are specialized in generating 
transparency and de-personalization, while the latter in reducing or resolving conflict. 
Hence: 
Condition VI 
Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd  F>A    if    b * (c + d) > m. 
 
At this juncture, it should be noticed that there are still many formulas that satisfy these 
conditions, i.e. formulas that are equifinal in generating high innovation or high 
efficiency or high fairness. Here, we are going to further refine the laws of structural 
heterogeneity by introducing further discriminating contingencies (non organizational 
variables in varying states).   
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Introducing contingencies 
The portfolio of equifinal formulas can be restricted if further conditions are added.. 
They can be represented by some contingencies to be met by the formulas. One 
parsimonious way of doing so is to summarize those contingencies in terms of the 
nature of tasks and interdependencies to be governed (as done in all research traditions 
we are drawing on). In particular, the different elements of organizing are known to be 
specialized to the level of uncertainty of tasks and inter-task relations.  
Bureaucratic elements are good in generating static efficiency in stable tasks, hence the 
proposition that formulas enriched in bureaucracy generate high efficiency contained in 
our former study is likely to be valid only for static efficiency. A combination of 
bureaucratic mechanisms with market elements (especially through outsourcing and 
externalization of activities) is known to be good in generating dynamic efficiency in 
variable tasks (Mariotti and Cainarca 1986).  
Hence, denoting uncertainty as U, qualifying it as either low (L) or high (H) and 
constraining all the doses of elements (m, b, c, d) to be > 1 due to the first law of 
organizational core variety, the law of structural heterogeneity for static and dynamic 
efficiency can be expressed as follows:   
 
Condition VII 
U
 L* Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd  E>A  if  b >  m* c * d  
Condition VIII 
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U
 H * Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd  E>A if  m*b > c*d  
 
If the effective organization of innovation is considered, a distinction can also be made 
between innovation in known tasks and techniques, versus innovation in settings where 
tasks and techniques have to be discovered altogether. Taking into account both 
classical works (Burns and Stalker 1961) and recent empirical works shading some 
light on the ‘routinization of innovation’ and innovation in mature industries (Kilduff 
and Sawyer 2003; Brusoni 2006), it can be hypothesized that in mature, known settings  
the organization of innovation can be more modular, while in highly dynamic and 
innovative settings it  needs to be more integrated. Hence, organizational formulas for 
innovation in less uncertain action fields could be richer in market and/ or 
bureaucratic elements (both infuse modularity into a system), while in more uncertain 
action fields, organizational formulas should be richer in community and/or democracy 
(both infuse integration). 
 
Condition IX 
U
 L* Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd   I>A  if (m + b) > c*d + (m*b) > c*d 
Condition X 
U
 H* Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd   I>A  if (c+d) > m* b  
 
If this were true, it would indicate that the set of formulas for high innovation under 
low uncertainty has an intersection with the set of formulas for high efficiency under 
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high uncertainty (the intersection, i.e. the multifunctional formula, being the market and 
bureaucracy enriched formulas).  
 
Fairness in stable and known activities is also likely to be best achieved through 
different mechanisms than in uncertain conditions. While transparency and equal 
opportunities and treatment may generally associate fairness outcomes with some 
elements of bureaucracy, the level of uncertainty may discriminate between community 
and democracy as complements: communitarian elements are possibly sufficient in 
stable setting, while democratic mechanisms and organizational justice provisions 
should be more robust under uncertain conditions (Miller 1992; Grandori forth). Hence, 
organizational formulas for fairness can be hypothesized to be richer in bureaucracy 
and community in stable settings, richer in bureaucracy and democracy in dynamic and 
uncertain settings.   
 
Condition XI 
U
 L* Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd   F>A    if c*b > m *d  
Condition XII 
U
 H*Bb*Mm*Cc*Dd   F>A   if d*b > m *c  
 
The organizational formulas generated by the above set of  conditions are summarized 
in  Table 3, which shows all the equifinal formulas written in extended form, assuming 
that the maximum number of each element is 4 (as found in our recent empirical study 
in the Italian context). Hence, Table 3 gives an immediate, substantive, picture of the 
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type and number of contingent formulas resulting from the analysis (equifinal formulas 
are indicated with the same color in different cells).  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Conclusions 
This work has revisited and revitalized the notion of organization forms as clusters 
of attributes, providing a systematic classification of attributes as ‘organizational 
elements’ – in analogy with natural elements in chemistry – and outlined a series of 
laws of combinations on how elements can combine into organizational formulas. Some 
notable features of the conjectured (and partially tested) combination laws are worth 
noticing:  
 
- they include both universal and contingency laws (i.e. specify which ‘features’ 
are generally necessary in order to have a high performing organization and 
which are necessary only under particular circumstances); 
- they admit equifinality and  predict structural heterogeneity (e.g. it is argued that 
more than one ‘cluster of features’ can achieve high performance under the 
same circumstances, and it is specified which ones). 
 
   Among the substantive conclusions, it is worthwhile to highlight that: 
 
- Bureaucratic elements are highly multifunctional , especially under low uncertainty 
- Democratic elements are multifunctional under high uncertainty, especially in the 
achievement of  innovation and fairness.;  
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- Market elements are more specialized elements, especially with regard to 
innovation and uncertainty.  
- in stable settings, either efficiency and innovation or fairness and efficiency can be 
achieved with the same formula (enriched in bureaucracy and either market or 
community). 
- There is no formula in common between efficiency and innovation in dynamic 
settings or between fairness and innovation in stable settings. This result indicates 
an area of trade-off for designers, giving an idea of the outcomes that are more 
difficult to achieve simultaneously in the two settings. 
- There are many ways of being innovative in highly uncertain settings (the set of 
equifunctional formulas is particularly wide). This is an interesting result, that 
provides a solution for a phenomenon that is currently considered a ‘puzzle’: how is 
it possible, and is it ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, that diverse organizational arrangements, in 
particular highly communitarian and highly market-rich arrangements, are 
observable in the governance of knowledge – intensive activities? (Foss 2007).  
 
The results also have implications for organization redesign and change. Some changes, 
in terms of meeting different contingencies or of achieving different mixes of 
outcomes, requires to change more elements, while others may imply changing just one 
element. For instance, only one additional D element is required in order to find several 
formulas able to achieve all three objective functions in uncertain settings.  This is a 
significant refinement with respect to the usual application of the notion of 
complementarity to organizational change. We suggest that the idea that the wider the 
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set of practices that are changed together, the better (due to the presence of interactions 
among practices) is too rough and resource wasting, and derives from not knowing 
where complementarities lie. The organizational chemistry framework  illustrated here 
should help in making hypotheses on what elements are complementary, in what doses 
and under what circumstances; hence, in enhancing our capacity of selective 
intervention and ad hoc organization design, including a diagnosis of what  elements  
may be kept invariant while other change. 
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Table 1 – Organizational Elements and Practices 
Types of organizational 
elements 
Single Elements 
 
 
Practices 
predominantly 
embodying the 
element 
 
 
References 
 
Market-like Elements 
 
  Price 
 
 
  Pay for 
performance 
(individual)  Pay for 
performance  
   (team and  firm-  
   based) 
 
 
Von Hayek 1945 
Hirschman 1970 
Williamson  
1975; 1993 
Zenger and Hesterly 
1997 
 
  Exit 
 
 
  Outsourcing  Internal labor 
mobility 
 
 
Bureaucratic Elements 
 
  Formal Rules 
 
 
   Evaluation System  Formal procedures 
and programs 
 
Gouldner  1954 
Blau and Scott 1962 
Pugh et al 1969 
 
 
  Hierarchy  
 
  Vertical 
Articulation of  
formal structure (no 
authority implied) 
 
Communitarian Elements 
 
 
  Knowledge Sharing 
 
 
  Knowledge sharing 
techniques  Project-based self- 
organization  
 
 
Hofstede 1980 
Ouchi 1980 
Kogut and Zander 
1996 
 
  Preference Sharing 
(objectives alignment) 
 
 Teaming  Community 
building practices 
 
 
Democratic Elements 
 
 
  Weighting of organizational 
members preferences  
  Competence- 
and/or preference-
based job design  Empowerment 
 
Gouldner 1954 
Lammers and Szell 
1989 
Blair 1995  
Harrison and 
Freeman 2004 
 
  Diffusion of decision rights 
holding 
  Responsibility 
Centers   Diffusion of  
decision and 
reward rights to 
units 
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Application Domain 
(transaction, activity, resource) 
to which the two generic elements are 
applied 
 
  
 
Same domain Different domain 
Difference  
between  two generic 
types of organizational 
elements 
Same Type 
 
Substituability 
 
Pooled 
Complementarity 
 
Different Type 
 
Symbiotic 
Complementarity  
 
Independence  
(neither 
substitutability nor 
complementarity) 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Types of Relationships among Organizational Elements 
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 EFFICIENCY INNOVATION FAIRNESS 
LOW  
UNCERTAINTY  
 
Formulas enriched in B 
 
M1*B2*C1*D1 + M1*B3*C1*D1 + 
M2*B3*C2*D2 + M1*B3*C2*D2 + 
M1*B3*C2*D1 + M2*B3*C1*D1 + 
M2*B3*C1*D2 + M1*B3*C1*D2 + 
       E>A   
 
Formulas enriched in B and M 
 
M2*B2*C1*D1+ M3*B3*C1*D1 + 
M3*B3*C2*D2 + M3*B3*C1*D2 + 
M3*B3*C2*D1 + M3*B2*C1*D1 + 
M2*B3*C1*D1  I>A   
 
Formulas enriched in B and C 
 
M1*B2*C2*D1 + M1*B3*C3*D1 +  
M2*B3*C3*D2 + M1*B3*C3*D2 +  
M2*B3*C3*D1 + M1*B3*C2*D1 + 
M1*B2*C3*D1  F>A 
HIGH  
UNCERTAINTY  
Formulas enriched in B and M 
 
M2*B2*C1*D1 + M3*B3*C1*D1 +  
M3*B3*C2*D2 + M3*B3*C1*D2 +  
M3*B3*C2*D1 + M3*B2*C1*D1 +                
M2*B3*C1*D1  E>A   
 
Formulas enriched in C or D 
 
M1*B1*C1*D2 + M1*B1*C1*D3 +  
M2*B1*C1*D3 + M2*B2*C1*D3 +  
M2*B2*C2*D3 + M2*B1*C2*D3 +                
M1*B2*C2*D3 + M1*B2*C1*D3  
M1*B1*C2*D1 + M1*B1*C3*D1 +  
M2*B1*C3*D1 + M2*B2*C3*D1 +  
M2*B2*C3*D2 + M2*B1*C3*D2 +                
M1*B2*C3*D2 + M1*B2*C3*D1   I>A   
Formulas enriched in B and D 
 
M1*B2*C1*D2 + M1*B3*C1*D3 +  
M2*B3*C2*D3 + M1*B3*C2*D3 +  
M2*B3*C1*D3 + M1*B3*C1*D2 + 
M1*B2*C1*D3   F>A 
 
Table 3 - Equifinal Organizational Formulas (by function and contingency)
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i
  Recent and relevant contributions in organizational sociology concerned with organization forms, such as 
the just quoted article by Hannan et al or neo-institutionalism, are not considered. The reason is that in 
those approaches the definition of organizational features and the patterns of their clustering are seen as 
conforming to the expectations of reference groups and of the dispensers of legitimacy. Hence those 
approaches do not offer inputs for specifying elements and combinatory laws in a micro-analytic way.   
 
ii
  These contributions are the only ones to our knowledge that conceive these types of elements as classes of 
mechanisms to be combined in order to explain or construct any organizational system, rather than as 
full institutions, that is, as ‘discrete structural alternatives’ themselves, e.g. ‘the market’, ‘the firm’, etc. (as 
they are in apparently similar typologies drawn up by others, such as Williamson, Lindblom, or Etzioni). 
Fiske’s ‘fundamental elements of sociality’ are ‘market pricing’, ‘authority ranking’, ‘equality matching’, 
and ‘communal sharing’; Grandori and Miller contribute to identifying single elements within each class, 
such as pricing, exit, voting, teaming, negotiation, authority and agency, rules and procedures, norms and 
culture, property rights.  
  
iii
 The concepts and procedures employed in BCA are illustrated in greater detail in Ragin (1987; 2000) and 
on the website www.fsqca.com. Two methodological papers (Fiss 2007; Furnari 2007) address specifically 
the motivations underlying the use of BCA in organization design studies.   
 
iv
  In standard BCA notations, lower-case letters indicate the absence of a causal condition or of an outcome. 
Lower case notations will not be used in this paper for the sake of simplicity.  
 
v
  No statistically significant sufficient condition was found for innovation. This is an interesting asymmetry 
in the predictability of the outcomes of organizational formulas, although it may appear obvious,as 
innovation is uncertain by definition and organization can set necessary conditions but not guarantee the 
outcome.   
